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Abstract:  This paper aims at investigating the importance that consumers assign to 
local network effects (i.e. the extent to which they take into account their contacts’ 
operators  in  determining  their  choices)  and  at  identifying  which  individual 
characteristics affect consumers’ preferences in relation to local network effects. 
Based  on  a  sample  of  193  Italian  students,    we  find  that  consumers  are  highly 
heterogeneous  with  respect  to  the  evaluation  of  the  importance  of  their 
friend/family’s  operator  when  choosing  their  own  provider,  and  that  such 
heterogeneity  is  associated  to  specific  characteristics  related  to  individual 
innovativeness and patterns of mobile phone usage. In particular, consumers who 
are more interested in local network effects are typically sophisticated users, who use 
intensively voice services and who are early adopters. Interestingly, consumers who 
pay attention to local network effects end up spending relatively little in proportion 








                                                 
1 Corresponding author. E-mail to nicoletta.corrocher@unibocconi.it. Comments are welcome. 
   2 
1. Introduction 
 
In  mobile  communications,  termination-based  price  discrimination  occurs  when 
firms fix tariffs for calls that terminate on other operators’ network (off-net calls) that 
are higher than tariffs for calls that terminate on their own network (on-net calls). 
This practice, which is commonly observed in real markets, is usually justified by the 
difference in marginal cost between on-net calls and off-net calls, since the second 
ones  include  the  access  cost  paid  by  the  originating  firm  to  the  receiving  one. 
Another  effect  of  termination-based  price  discrimination,  however,  is  to  induce 
“artificial“ network effects. Since individuals typically call a small subset of the entire 
population (e.g., family members and friends), network effects are local, in the sense 
that, ceteris paribus, for a consumer is convenient to adopt the same operator of the 
consumer she calls more frequently. 
 
Notwithstanding the possible relevance of this effect, the evidence on this kind of 
local  network  effects  in  mobile  communications  is  scant  (Birke  and  Swann,  2005; 
Birke and Swann, 2006). For this reason, our goal in this paper is twofold: first, we 
intend to investigate the importance that consumers assign to local network effects 
(i.e.  the  extent  to  which  they  take  into  account  their  contacts’  operators  in 
determining  their  choices);  second,  we  want  to  identify  which  individual 
characteristics affect consumers’ preferences in relation to local network effects. 
Our empirical exercise was carried out in a population of 193 Italian students, from 
which we collected various information related to mobile phone usage.  Our results 
suggest that consumers are highly heterogeneous with respect to the evaluation of 
the importance of their friend/family’s operator when choosing their own provider, 
and  that  such  heterogeneity  is  associated  to  specific  characteristics  related  to 
individual  innovativeness  and  patterns  of  mobile  phone  usage.  In  particular, 
consumers  who  are  more  interested  in  local  network  effects  are  typically 
sophisticated users, who use intensively voice services and who are early adopters. 
Interestingly, consumers who pay attention to local network effects end up spending 
relatively little in proportion to their intensity of use. We believe that our results can 
be of interest both to managers, involved in determining pricing strategies of mobile   3 
operators, and to policy makers, since sound theoretical arguments suggest that local 
network effects can increase firms’ market power.   
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a short overview of 
the  literature  on  global  and  local  network  effects.  After  highlighting  the  main 
features  of  the  mobile  communications  sector,  section  3  discusses  and  provides 
evidence  on  the  issue  of  local  network  effects  with  reference  to  the  mobile 
communications  industry.  At  the  end  of  this  section  we  formulate  our  research 
questions. Section 4 describes our sample and section 5 reports the results of the 
empirical analysis. Finally, section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Global and local network effects: background literature 
 
The aim of this section is to briefly introduce the notion of (local) network effects. In 
the section 3 we will then apply this notion to the case of the mobile communications 
service industry. 
 
The literature on network effects has started with the seminal contribution of Rohlfs 
(1974). As Church and Gandal (2004) point out, a network effect exists “if the value [of 
adopting a system component] increases in the number of other adopters that (ultimately) join 
the network by purchasing compatible products” (Church and Gandal, 2004; p.4). The 
source  of  benefits  positively  depends  on  the  size  of  the  network  when  adoption 
occurs. The larger the network, the greater are the benefits from adoption. Networks 
effects can be direct and or indirect.  Direct networks effects arise when adopters 
become  part  of  a  network  by  purchasing  a  product  that  provides  a  (direct) 
connection  between  the  adopter  and  other  users  who  bought  the  same  product2. 
Having a large network of compatible mobile phone users for instance makes new 
users more likely to join. In the case of indirect networks effects, adopters gain utility 
from the joint consumption of two components that interact to form a system. In this 
case, the product (hardware component) has no direct value for the adopter unless it 
                                                 
2 Typical examples of direct network effects are present in the telephone exchange and the fax.   4 
is  used  together  with  another  product  (software  component);  here  vertical 
compatibility (between the system components) matters3.  
 
In the case of a single good, the literature has emphasised the role of expectations 
and  the  existence  of  multiple  equilibria  (Katz  and  Shapiro,  1994).  Networks  of 
different  sizes  (to  which  different  levels  of  social  welfare  are  associated)  can  be 
sustained in equilibria with self-fulfilling expectations, and several mechanisms have 
been suggested to avoid the risk of inefficiencies. In case of competition between 
incompatible goods (Katz and Shapiro, 1985), multiple equilibria also emerge quite 
naturally, where one of the firms ends up monopolizing the market. In a dynamic 
perspective,  small  “historical  accidents”  can  determine  the  winning  firm  (Arthur, 
1989). 
 
More recently, the literature has considered the issue of local network effects (Swann, 
2002). Network effects are local if the value for a consumer of adopting a product or a 
technology is increasing in the number of adopters in a subset of the population, 
which varies among consumers. In the case of adoption of consumers, this subset 
typically coincide with the consumers’ social neighbourhood, while for firms this is 
defined by the business network the firm is embedded in. Local network effects are 
very common in communication networks, where consumers primarily consider the 
patterns  of  adoption  by  agents  in  their  social  neighbourhood,  but  for  software 
programs as well, where consumers are concerned with the decision of people with 
whom they usually exchange data and information.  
 
Some recent contributions have studied local network effects both from a theoretical 
and empirical perspective. On the theoretical side, for instance, Sundararajan (2004) 
analyses a simultaneous move game of adoption with incomplete information and 
shows how the resulting network of adopters is influenced by the underlying social 
structure. More directly related to this paper, Banerji and Dutta (2006) consider a 
duopoly  in  a  market  with  functionally  homogeneous  goods,  where  groups  of 
                                                 
3  Examples  of  indirect  network  can  be  found  in  the  field  of  computing  (operating  systems  and 
application software) and consumer electronics (video cassette systems, compact disks).     5 
consumers interact only with some of the other groups. They show that, for some 
structures of social  networks, firms can obtain positive profits even with Bertand 
competition, if products are partially compatible. In this case, segmented markets can 
emerge, whereby different groups of consumers are served by different firms. This 
means that the existence of consumers’ social structure may soften competition4.  On 
the  empirical  side,  Tucker  (2004)  analyses  the  adoption  of  a  video-messaging 
technology by employees of a financial firm, and finds support for the hypothesis 
that the choice of adopting of an employee is influenced uniquely by people she 
communicates with. The papers by Birke and Swann (2005, 2006), who considered 
local network effects in mobile communications as we do, are discussed at length in 
the next section.  
 
3. Local network effects in the mobile communications service industry 
 
In the case of the mobile communication sector, technology–driven direct network 
effects  arise  for  non-voice  services  such  as  text  messages  and  video  calls,  while 
indirect network effects are associated to new services related to 3G mobile phones. 
In this paper we focus on induced networks externalities, which follow from firms’ 
pricing  strategies.  In  particular,  we  are  concerned  with  termination-based  price 
discrimination (Laffont et al., 1998), which occurs when firms fix tariffs for calls that 
terminate on other operators’ network (off-net calls) that are higher than tariffs for 
calls that terminate on their network (on-net calls).  
 
Termination-based  price  discrimination  induces  network  effects  because,  ceteris 
paribus,  it  is  convenient  to  adopt  the  operator  with  the  largest  customer  base. 
However, network effects are local, since individuals typically call a small subset of 
the  entire  population.  In  other  terms,  it  is  an  individual’s  social  network  which 
constitutes the relevant reference group which influences his/her choice of operator.  
 
                                                 
4The  result  that  local  network  externalities  lead  to  “co-existence”  is  also  commonly  found  in  the 
literature on technology adoption (e.g. Cowan and Miller, 1998).  
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From the empirical point of view, some detailed evidence on this issue is provided 
by Corrocher and Zirulia (2006)5, who analyse the industry in Italy. In this market, 
which is one of the most developed in Europe, tariff plans with termination-based 
price  discrimination  appeared  in  1997,  when  two  firms  were  active  in  the  Italian 
market,  TIM,  the  former  fixed-line  monopoly  and  leader  in  the  mobile 
communications  market,  and  Vodafone.  However,  they  became  popular  in  the 
period 1999-2000, when competition became more intense with the entry of a third 
operator, WIND. In these two years, 73.81% of all the newly introduced contracts 
were discriminating between off-net and on-net calls. The percentage for TIM was 
83.67%, for Vodafone was 23.08%, for Wind was 53.33%. In the following years, the 
percentage of contracts featuring termination-based price discrimination remained 
high,  even  if  at  a  lower  level.  In  the  two-year  period  2001-2002,  the  overall 
percentage  of  discriminating  contracts  was  47.83  %  (52.38%  for  TIM,  47%  for 
Vodafone, 25% for Wind); in the period 2003-2005, when a fourth firm (3) entered the 
market,  the  figures  were  48.15%  for  the  entire  market,  60%    for  TIM,  33.3%  for 
Vodafone, 53.3% for Wind and 52.63% for 3.  Overall, this evidence shows that Italian 
operators tried to induce pecuniary network effects: this is particularly true for the 
largest firm, TIM, but it applies also to the followers.  
 
In considering local network effects in mobile communications, this paper takes as a 
starting point the contributions of Birke and Swann (2005 and 2006), but it tackles the 
issue  from  a  different  perspective.  Those  papers  aim  at  studying  and  measuring 
consumers’ coordination in operator choices in presence of network effects induced 
by firms’ pricing strategies.  In Birke and Swann (2006), the authors find evidence of 
coordination of operators within UK families that cannot be reconduced to overall 
market  shares.  In  Birke  and  Swann  (2005),  the  authors  look  at  the  coordination 
within each consumer’s social network for a population of students at Nottingham 
University. They find that the probability the students have the  same operator is 
higher, the higher the frequency with which they call each other. 
                                                 
5 The strategy of termination-based price discrimination is also important in other countries such as 
the UK (Valletti and Cave, 1998). 
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These two papers infer the importance of local network effects from the existence of 
coordination within subgroups (family and groups of friends). However, they do not 
provide  direct  evidence  that  consumers  look  at  their  contacts’  provider  when 
choosing  their  own  operator.  Their  analysis  is  static,  so  that  they  do  not  offer 
evidence  of  a  coordination  process,  which  presumably  occurs  over  time.  The 
supportive evidence the authors provide is mixed. In Birke and Swann (2005), the 
authors  show  that  friends  do  not  coordinate  the  choice  of  handsets,  which  could 
prove that there are no unobserved characteristics that lead friends to make similar 
choices if not related to the induced newtork externalities. However, in Birke and 
Swann  (2006),  they  show  the  existence  of  a  disprortionate  share  of  on-net  calls 
unrelated to price differentials, which indeed does suggest  a form of coordination 
among friends in operator choices independently from local network effects (or, at 
least,  some other factors exist that leads friends to choose the same operator). 
 
It is worth mentioning that in principle there are reasons why consumers could be 
unaffected  by  their  contacts  when  choosing  their  operator6.  First,  since 
communication is guaranteed by full compatibility among operators, there are no 
technical obstacles for those who choose an operator which is not popular within 
their  social  neighbourhood.  Therefore the  benefit  stemming  from  the  existence  of 
local network effects is purely pecuniary. Second, the size of the network depends on 
the intensity of use of mobile phones. For instance, if the usage of mobile phones by a 
specific consumer is limited, consumers bear a small total cost differential associated 
to termination-based discrimination between different operators. In particular this 
cost is smaller than the search cost to be paid to screen different options. If this is 
true, then firm’s strategies aimed at enforcing termination-based price discrimination 
might not be as successful as they expect. 
                                                 
6As the Italian case shows, firms also offer contracts without termination-based price discrimination.  
Consumers can choose operators which offer contracts such that the operators of their family and 
friends  do  not  affect  prices.  It  is  true  that  even  in  this  case  the  operators  of  a  consumer’s  social 
network affect his/her choices (intuitively, a non-discriminating tariff plan is more attractive for users 
whose contacts are uniformly distributed across operators), but the choice is not linked to a network 
externalities argument. 
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Given this background, we aim at investigating two  research questions. First, we 
want  to  produce  direct  evidence  on  the  importance  consumers  attribute  to  local 
network effects, i.e. if they take into account their contacts’ operators when making 
their choices. Second, we want to determine which factors at the individual level 
affect  such  attitude.  In  this  respect,  we  rely  on  the  idea  the  consumers  are 
heterogenous, not only in terms of willingness to pay and modes of service usage, 
but  also  in  their  degree  of  sophistication  or  knowledge  base.    Consumers  can  be 
categorized not only in relation to their speed of adoption (Rogers, 2003), but also in 
their pattern of consumption. Even more, it is possible that early adopters in this 
sector are not the most sophisticated users (or “lead users” à la von Hippel, 1988). In 
the mobile communications industry, it is possible to identify two main classes of 
lead users: “the technological early adopters”, and “the emotional early adopters”. 
The  first  category  is  composed  by  those  individuals  who  use  the  devices  in  a 
professional way, exploiting all the included features. The second category of lead 
users  -  the  emotional  early  adopters  –  is  represented  by  people  who  are  not 
necessarily  technological  experts,  but  who  have  a  great  sensibility  to  technical 
changes and innovations. They have low price elasticity and pay great attention to 
their life-style and tend to buy experimental products just launched on the market. 
Quite interestingly, their interests and needs, unlike the technological early adopters’ 
ones, will be probably common to the mass market in the near future.  In terms of 
managerial  implications,  our  point  is  that  the  different  degrees  of  consumer 
sophistication may have important consequences on firms’ pricing strategies. 
 
The possibility that local network effects can constitute a source of market power, as 
we mentioned in the previous section, has obvious managerial implications for firms 
in  mobile  communications.  In  this  industry,  the  substantial  homogeneity  of  the 
service  provided  would  lead  towards  strong  forms  of  competition,  with  negative 
effects  on  firms’  profits.  Operators, then,  are  in  search  of  strategies  to  escape  the 
“Bertrand paradox”. Furthermore, local network effects may lead to market power 
also  by  creating  switching  costs.  If  consumers  actually  choose  their  operator  to 
exploit  local  network  effects,  individual  change  of  operator  may  be  costly,  thus   9 
inducing consumer inertia. Furthermore, customers must usually communicate their 
habitual contacts that they changed operator, since this change affects the price of 
calls, and this constitute another source of switching costs (or other costs could exist 
if  they  do  not  do  so).  In  that  respect,  local  network  effects  resulting  from  firms 
strategies  can  provide  an  explanation  for  the  fact  that  number  portability  has 
reduced, but not eliminated switching costs (see Grzybowski (2007) for the UK and 
Lee et al. (2006) for South Korea).  
 
The  link  between  local  network  effects  and  market  power  is  of  interest  to  policy 
makers as well. Although strategies creating artificial local network effects are not 
per  se  subject  to  sanctions,  their  consequences  in  terms  of  social  welfare  and 
competition  should  be  of  interest  for  policy  makers,  when  they  examine  the 
competitiveness of the mobile communication sector and evaluate the desirability of 
welfare improving interventions.  
 
4. Sample description and descriptive evidence on consumers’ choices 
 
The empirical analysis in this paper focuses on a sample of consumers in Italy. In 
particular, it is based upon a survey of 193 students with a mobile phone. Selecting 
students ensures a highly homogeneous respondent set and thus can accomplish the 
ideal theory falsification procedure (Calder et al., 1981). The survey was carried out 
among students in the fourth and fifth year of high school, and in the first year of 
university (undergraduate degree)7. We selected a young population, as we believe 
that  the  impact  of  social  network  on  consumers’  choices  can  be  better  captured 
within groups of young people who study together and are more likely to be affected 
by  friends  in  their  choice  of  mobile  operators.  Furthermore,  young  consumers  of 
today  will  be  the  most  important  consumers  of  tomorrow  and  analysing  their 
behaviour can provide important information on future trends. The questionnaire is 
made of 25 questions, which investigate the patterns of adoption of mobile phones 
and mobile operators, in terms of time of adoption, motivations behind adoption, 
                                                 
7 The authors would like to thank Daniel Birke for his availability in sharing the main structure of his 
survey.   10 
number of pre-paid cards and characteristics of the tariff plan, importance of factors 
behind  the  choice  of  operators  (e.g.  network  coverage,  network  effects,  services 
provided),  intensity  of  usage  of  voice  and  non-voice  services  (minutes),  and 
estimated expenditures in voice and non-voice services. 
 
In  terms  of  gender  and  age  distribution,  29%  of  the  sample  is  made  of  female 
students and 71% of male students. The average age is 18.4 years. A specific question 
in the survey asked respondents to report when they first bought (or were given) a 
mobile phone: 57% of respondents bought it before April 2001 and less than 10% 
after  June  2002. In  terms  of  mobile  handset,  Nokia  is the  most  popular  producer 
(37.6% of respondents), followed by Samsung (19.3%) and Motorola (15.3%). This 
means that in our sample the market for handsets appears to be quite concentrated, 
with three firms owning more than 70% of users. 
 
An interesting insight on patterns of adoption comes from the investigation of the 
reasons behind the purchase of a mobile phone8. Indeed, 62.7% of respondents state 
that they bought a mobile phone to be called or tracked by friends and family, while 
28% wanted a phone to call friends and family and 25.9% to send text messages. This 
means  that  social  networks  play  an  important  role  in  affecting  the  adoption  of  a 
mobile phone. On the contrary there is a scarce evidence of pure “herd behaviour”, 
since just 7% of respondents declare that they bought a phone because everyone else 
had it. Finally, if we look at the distribution of users across mobile operators, we note 
that 64.8% of respondents use Vodafone-Omnitel, 23.3% TIM, 6.2% Wind and 5.7% 3. 
This is somewhat surprising, considering that in 2004 TIM’s market share was 43%, 
Vodafone’s market share was 36%, Wind’s market share was 17% and 3’s market 
share was 4%. However, it is worth noticing that the market leader, who is also first 
mover in Italy, traditionally targets users with a high willingness to pay (such as 
business users), while the follower competes by concentrating on consumers with 
low  willingness  to  pay  –  typically  young  people.  As  the  survey  was  carried  out 
among students, this might explain the bias in our sample. Quite interestingly, 26% 
                                                 
8 The related question allowed multiple answers.   11 
of respondents state that changed operator at some point in time. With reference to 
this issue, we do not observe more preferences towards one specific operator, i.e. the 
distribution of individuals who changed operator is even across operators. The most 
important reasons behind this change are “The operator did not provide convenient tariff 
plans and/or promotions” (28% of respondents) and “My friends used a different operator” 
(26%  of  respondents).  This  evidence  is  already  pointing  at  the  idea  that  network 
effects  constitute  an  important  factor  in  determining  users’  choices  in  the  mobile 
communication sector. 
 
5. Empirical analysis: demand patterns and network effects 
 
In this section, we take a micro level perspective to study the importance of different 
factors in determining the choice of the specific mobile operator by adopters, and 
investigate how motivations vary across different across groups of adopters on the 
basis  of  individual  characteristics  and  patterns  of  consumptions.  One  specific 
question in our survey asked respondents to rate on a five-point scale (1 being “not 
important”,  5  being  “very  important”)  the  importance  of  different  factors  when 
choosing the specific operator. These factors are: network coverage; special offers on 
phone calls, text messages, multimedia messages; bundling between operator and 
handset; tariff attractiveness9; friends using the same operator; family using the same 
operator;  boyfriend/girlfriend  using  the  same  operator;  available  services  (e.g. 
games); post-sale customer services. 36 respondents state that they did not choose the 
operator  by  themselves,  because  someone  else  did  it  for  them.  Therefore  the 
reference sample for our empirical analysis is made of 157 users .Table I illustrates 
the distribution of respondents within each factor. 
 
{Insert Table I approximately here} 
 
                                                 
9 Second degree price discrimination is very common in the sector, making it virtually impossible for 
consumers to calculate the most convenient offering. However, among the factors driving the choice 
of a specific operator, we decided to include the fact that consumers might perceive tariff plans of 
specific operators particularly convenient for them and to base their choice on perceived prices.    12 
Network coverage and tariffs appear to be the most important determinants affecting 
the choice of operators, but network effects are also relevant. We have three variables 
identifying  network  effects:  friends,  family  and  partner  with  the  same  operator. 
These  variables  play  an  important  role  in  determining  the  adoption.  61.8%  rate 
“friends’ operator” as important or very important, while this percentage is 48.41% 
for “family’s operator” and 48.75% for “partners’ operator”.  
 
For  the  scope  of  our  paper,  we  reduce  the  number  of  variables  related  to  the 
importance of different factors for adoption, by way of factor analysis.10 Results are 
reported in Table II.  
 
{Insert Table II approximately here} 
 
We can identify three underlying factors, which relate differently to network effects, 
tariffs and quality of services, and bundling opportunities. The first factor, labelled 
‘Tariff/quality of service’, is explained by network coverage, by the existence of special 
offers,  by  tariff  attractiveness  and  by  the  availability  of  a  wide  range  of  services. 
Clearly,  these  variables  are  particularly  important  for  users  who  are  concerned 
mostly with service quality and costs when engaging in the process of adoption. The 
second  factor,  ‘Network  effects’,  is  explained  by  family  and  friends  with  the  same 
operator,  and  reflects  the  importance  of  network  effects  in  choosing  a  specific 
operator.  The  third  factor,  ‘Bundling’,  is  explained  mostly  by  the  existence  of 
bundling between the handset and the specific tariff plan (operator) and, to a lesser 
extent, by the range of services offered.  
 
The  factor  analysis  provides  an  input  for  the  cluster  analysis,  which  aims  at 
characterising the variety of attitudes towards adoption of mobile operators and, in 
particular, at identifying which individual characteristics mostly affect the relevance 
of network effects. The purpose of the clustering exercise is indeed to detect patterns 
of  demand  across  different  categories  of  users.  Four  clusters  emerge  out  of  the 
                                                 
10 Within each component, we focus on the variables that display a factor loading greater than 0.50.   13 
analysis  (Table  III)  and  statistical  tests  confirm  that  the  factors  are  significantly 
different across clusters. 
 
{Insert Table III approximately here} 
 
Cluster 1 includes users who evaluate relatively more network effects, so that we 
label this pattern of adoption “social network oriented”. Cluster 2 includes users who 
do not put much emphasis on any specific factor and therefore choose the mobile 
operator  in  a  random  way  (“random”).  Cluster  3  includes  users  with  a  pattern  of 
choice of operators focused on quality of service and tariff considerations, so that we 
label this pattern of adoption tariff/quality oriented. Finally, Cluster 4 consists of users, 
who  choose  their  operator  because  of  bundling  advantages  deriving  from  their 
handset. All in all, this evidence suggests that there is a high degree of heterogeneity 
in demand patterns and different groups of consumers are characterised by highly 
idiosyncratic characteristics that require further investigation. 
 
5.1 Explanatory variables 
 
In order to compare different groups of users in terms of motivations for choosing a 
specific  operator  and,  in  particular,  to  investigate  which  factors  determine  the 
importance  of  network  effects  in  affecting  users’  patterns  of  adoption,  we  have 
identified three groups of variables. 
 
First,  we  argue  that  network  effects  are  particularly  significant  for  users  who 
intensively use the mobile phone. This is because network effects bring about much 
more benefits the more contacts a user can exploit and the more time he/she spends 
on the phone. In order to capture the effect of intensity of usage on the importance of 
network effects, we asked respondents to evaluate how much time (minutes) they 
spend on the phone per week with different people (friends, family, partner, others) 
and how many text messages/multimedia messages they send per week to different 
people. We gave five ranges of possible answers, both for the intensity of phone calls 
(0; 1-20 minutes; 21-40 minutes; 41-60 minutes; more than 60 minutes) and for the   14 
intensity of text messages/multimedia messages usage (0; 1-10; 11-20; 21-30; more 
than 30). These answers were coded as varying between 0 and 4 for each of the four 
categories  of  people.  We  then  constructed  two  categorical  variables  – 
INTENSITYVOICE and INTENSITYSMS  –  by summing up all the values,  so that 
these two variables range between 0 and 16. As said before, we expect more intensive 
users to rate network effects more than others, i.e. we expect INTENSITYVOICE and 
INTENSITYSMS to be higher for users in cluster 1. 
 
Second, the importance of network effects might be also associated with the degree 
of  users’  sophistication.  Users  of  mobile  phones  are  extremely heterogeneous  not 
only  in  terms  of  intensity  of  usage  and  willingness  to  pay,  but  also  in  terms  of 
experience and information they collect on available services and tariff plans. In the 
first place, with the growing number of contracts provided by operators, consumers 
face  an  increasing  range  of  offers  and  might  find  it  difficult  to  identify  the  most 
suitable  tariff  plan  for  their  specific  needs.  Most  of  them  exploit  the  continuous 
development  of  innovative  tariff  plans  and  the  provision  of  promotions,  by 
switching to new contracts and sometimes to different operators, while others tend to 
be quite inertial. Furthermore, if we observe the type of services offered over the 
mobile network, we notice that firms offer a growing number of value added services 
such as ring tones/images, news, games, web surfing. We can argue that the use of 
value added services indicates users’ sophistication. Third, we asked respondents to 
name the tariff plan and/or promotion they are using. Only half of our respondents 
(54.4%) know the type of contract they use and it is reasonable to assume that these 
users  are  more  sophisticated  than  the  others.  In  general,  we  expect  more 
knowledgeable  users  to  put  more  attention  to  network  effects.  Fourth,  since  the 
introduction  of  pre-paid  cards,  users  in  Italy  have  had  the  possibility  of  using 
different sim cards (different operators) on their handsets, i.e. there is no “sim lock- 
in”.  We  could  think  that  having  two  sim  cards  allows  users  to  exploit  tariffs  of 
various  operators  discriminating  according  to  different  time  zones  or  different 
“social  networks”,  which  in  principle  would  permit  them  to  spend  less.  Clearly, 
these users monitor the emergence of new tariff plans and are particularly careful in   15 
choosing their contracts and operators. Given the availability of multiple sim cards, 
they do not need to conform to their social contacts’ choices in order to save money.  
 
In order to capture the effect of users’ sophistication on the perception of network 
effects,  we  built  four  variables,  PROMOTIONS,  SERVICES,  TARIFF  PLAN, 
CHANGEOP and TWOSIM. PROMOTION takes value 1 if consumers use seasonal 
promotions  (e.g.  Summer  Card,  which  allows  sending  free  text  messages  during 
summertime) and 0 otherwise. SERVICES takes value 1 if users utilise value added 
services and 0 otherwise. TARIFF PLAN takes value 1 if users know their tariff plan 
and 0 otherwise. CHANGEOP takes value 1 if consumers have changed operator 
since their first adoption and 0 otherwise. TWOSIM takes value 1 if consumers have 
two or more sim cards and 0 otherwise. From the above considerations, we expect 
users who use promotions and value added services, and users who are aware of 
their tariff plan to put more attention to network effects when choosing the operator 
(i.e. to be relatively more numerous in cluster 1). Turning to CHANGEOP, we notice 
that users who have changed operator since their first choice might have done so 
precisely to exploit network effects (with friends and family) and might appear as 
sophisticated  users,  so  that  we  can  expect them  to  be  relative  more  numerous  in 
cluster 1. With reference to TWOSIM, it can be argued that users with two sim cards 
do not need to pay attention to local network effects, as they can easily switch from 
one operator to another one. However, these are also sophisticated users. Therefore, 
we  do  not  have  any  a-priori  expectation  on  the  relationship  between  cluster 
membership and TWOSIM. 
 
Third, when evaluating the importance of network effects in consumers’ behaviour, 
we  need  to  consider  the  role  of  expenditures.  In  order  to  capture  the  effect  of 
expenditures on the relevance of network effects, we asked respondents to evaluate 
how much money they spend per month on phone calls and on text messages. We 
gave six possible ranges for phone calls (less than 10 €; 10-15 €; 16-20 €; 21-25 €; 26-35 
€; more than 35 €) and five possible ranges for text messages/multimedia messages 
(less than 10 €; 10-15 €; 16-20 €; 21-25 €; more than 25 €). The answers were coded 
between 0 and 5 for phone calls, and between 0 and 4 for text messages. We then   16 
built  two  variables,  EXPENDVOICE,  which  varies  between  0  and  5,  and 
EXPENDSMS, which varies between 0 and 4. We do not have any a-priori hypothesis 
on  the  impact  of  expenditures  on  the  importance  of  network  effects.  On  the  one 
hand,  since  one  might  think  that  expenditures  are  positively  associated  with  the 
intensity of usage and we argue that intensity of usage is positively associated with 
the  importance  of  network  effects,  then  we  might  expect  that  expenditures  and 
relevance  of  network  effects  are  also  positively  correlated.  On  the  other  hand, 
consumers who are more interested in network effects are also more able to choose 
the “best” operators, given their social contacts’ choices, and therefore should be able 
to reduce their expenditures, at least in relative terms. 
 
Finally, we control for three additional determinants of the relative importance of 
network effects for consumers. First, we know from  previous analysis (Corrocher 
and  Zirulia,  2006)  that  over  time  there  has  been  an  evolution  in  firms’  strategies 
towards  the  provision  of  contracts,  which  exploit  the  existence  of  local  network 
effects. In particular, we observe an increase in the number of tariff plans that favour 
groups of users with the same mobile operator, i.e. firms have been introducing new 
contracts with on-net charges much lower than off-net charges. The percentage of 
new contracts of this type went from 10.71% in the period 1997-1998 to 48.15% in the 
period 2003-2005, with a peak in 1999-2000, when 73.81% of new contracts had this 
characteristic.  Starting  from  this  evidence,  on  the  one  hand  we  might  think  that, 
other things being equal, early adopters are more sophisticated than late adopters, as 
they  had  the  opportunity  of  gathering  experience  and  learning  by  using.  On  the 
other  hand,  early  adopters  tend  to  be  users  with  high  willingness  to  pay  (as 
mentioned elsewhere), who are by definition less concerned about prices than late 
adopters.  Indeed  there  exists  a  negative  and  statistically  significant  correlation 
between YEARPURCH and EXPENDVOICE, which partially confirms this intuition. 
Furthermore,  we  might  expect  that  the  perception  of  the  importance  of  network 
effects in the choice of operators emerged when firms started offering tariff plans that 
discriminate between on-net and off-net calls, so that having friends and family with 
your  same  operator  became  a  significant  issue.  Therefore,  late  adopters  might  be 
more concerned about network effects than early users. Given these considerations,   17 
we  do  not  make  any  a-priori  hypothesis  on  the  impact  of  YEARPURCH  on 
NETWEXT. 
 
Second, in the survey we ask respondents to identify whether they pay for mobile 
services or someone else is paying for them. In order to control for this effect, we 
created a dummy variable AUTOFIN, which takes value 2 if the user himself pays, 1 
if  he  partially  pays,  and  0  otherwise.  We  expect  this  variable  to  be  positively 
correlated to the importance of network effects, as long as the budget constraint is 
not tight when the user himself does not pay.  
 
Third, we control for the operator. Empirical evidence on the Italian case shows that, 
beside the general trends in the market, some companies have been more active than 
others in introducing contracts based upon local network effects (see Table IV).  
 
{Insert Table IV approximately here} 
 
In order to control for the heterogeneity of operators, we created a dummy variable 
for each operator (TIM, VODAFONE, WIND and HG) which takes value 1 if the user 




The  cluster  analysis  allowed  use  to  identify  four  different  clusters  of  patterns  of 
adoption. Table IV summarises the differences across them in terms of the above-
mentioned variables, in order to investigate, in particular, what are the characteristics 
of users who perceive network effects to be a crucial variable when choosing their 
mobile operator. For each variable, values greater than the sample average suggest a 
stronger correlation of the variable with cluster membership. 
 
{Insert Table V approximately here} 
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We can first examine the impact of the intensity of usage on the perception of the 
importance of network effects in choosing the operator. As expected, intensive users 
consider  network  effects  an  important  factor  in  determining  their  choices.  The 
variable INTENSITYVOICE is greater than sample average for consumers in cluster 1 
and this result is consistent with the idea that the benefits stemming from network 
effects are higher for users who use the phone intensively. Only 18.2% of users in 
cluster 1 have a value of INTENSITYVOICE lower than 4, while this percentage is 
30% for users in cluster 2, 29.2% for users in cluster 3 and 26% for users in cluster 4. 
Furthermore, we find that more than 50% of very intensive users (i.e. users who talk 
on the phone for more than 40 minutes a week) belong to cluster 1. INTENSITY SMS 
is not significantly different across clusters. 
 
As expected we find a significant relationship between users’ sophistication and the 
perception of network effects as important factors. In particular, consumers in cluster 
1  have  higher  values  of  TARIFFPLAN  and  TWOSIM  as  compared  to  the  sample 
average and this confirms the idea that more sophisticated users are more sensitive 
to  network  effects.  With  reference  to  TWOSIM,  in  this  case  it  seems  that  the 
“sophistication” effect is stronger than the effect related to the fact that users with 
more than one sim card do not pay attention to network effects, as they can easily 
switch to other operators. On the contrary, the variable SERVICES is not significantly 
different across clusters. With reference to this, it can be argued that, although the 
use of value added services generally indicates a high degree of sophistication, this 
sophistication  concerns  services  whose  tariffs  are  not  affected  by  the  existence  of 
network effects, as they are not characterised by on-net/off-net discrimination. This 
is because these types of services do not involve communication between two users, 
but concern more the interaction between service providers and users.  
 
An  interesting  result  concerns  the  relationship  between  expenditures  and  the 
importance  of  network  effects.  Consumers  in  cluster  1  have  a  value  of 
EXPENDVOICE  which  is  greater  than  the  sample  average.  However,  it  is  worth 
noticing that consumers in this cluster are not the ones who spend most on voice 
services,  since  the  average  value  of  EXPENDVOICE  is  higher  for  consumers  in   19 
cluster  3.  If  we  investigate  more  in  depth  the  relationship  between  cluster 
membership and EXPENDVOICE, quite interestingly we observe that almost 30% of 
consumers  in  cluster  1  state  that  they  spend  less  than  10€  per  month,  while  this 
percentage is lower both for consumers in cluster 2 and for consumers in cluster 3. 
This result provides interesting insights on the relationship between expenditures 
and intensity of usage. From this analysis, it seems that there is no such a positive 
relationship between the time one spends over the phone and the money he/she 
spends. This might suggest that heavy users learn how to choose tariffs in order not 
to spend too much and this is done through the exploitation of network effects.  
 
Finally, when we control for year of adoption, and operator, we find that consumers 
in cluster 1 have generally adopted earlier than consumers in other clusters and that 
a higher percentage than the sample average using the operator TIM. First, these 
results  suggest  that  early  adopters  tend  to  pay  more  attention  to  network  effects 
when  choosing  their  operator  as  compared  to  other  consumers.  As  underlined 
before, a priori, the relationship between the year of adoption and the relevance of 
network effects is not clear, as two opposite effects are at stake. With reference to 
this,  our  empirical  evidence  suggests  that  early  adopters’  sophistication  is  more 
important than their higher willingness to pay. Second, the evidence on operators 
shows that users in cluster 1 tend to use TIM more than sample average. This is in 
line with the evidence (table IV) illustrating that this operator has been particularly 
active in introducing tariff plans which exploit network effects. As far as the variable 
AUTOFIN is concerned, we do not find significant differences across clusters, which 




The paper aimed at investigating the importance of different factors in the choice of 
mobile  telephone  operators  and  the  emerging  patterns  of  adoption.  The  attention 
was put on the role of local network effects and on the characteristics of consumers 
who take into account these effects when choosing their operator. To this scope, we 
carried out a survey among 193 high school and university students, by investigating   20 
patterns  of  adoption and  modes  of  usage  of  mobile  phone  services.  Our  analysis 
proceeded in two steps. First, using data from the questionnaire, we identified three 
determinants  of  adoption  by  means  of  a  factor  analysis:  tariff/quality,  network 
effects, bundling. Second, we clustered consumers around the factor loadings and 
examined  differences  across  clusters  along  a  series  of  variables  describing 
consumers’  innovativeness  and  mode  of  usage,  with  the  aim  of  singling  out  in 
particular  the  peculiarities  of  consumers  who  attribute  great  importance  to  local 
network effects. 
 
Empirical findings show that there is a high degree of heterogeneity in the market in 
terms  of  consumers’  degree  of  innovativeness  and  sophistication,  and  patterns  of 
mobile services usage. Of particular interest for our analysis, consumers who give 
importance to local network effects are intensive and sophisticated users of mobile 
phone services, as well as early adopters. In general, consumers that spend time and 
attention around the use of mobile phone services are also those who make their 
choices, taking into account the existence of local network effects. Interestingly, these 
users spend relatively little as compared to what could be expected and this partially 
reinforces the idea that consumers who do not take into account the choice of their 
social  contacts  when  choosing  their  own  operator  pay  an  extra  cost  for  this 
behaviour. 
 
Our results have both policy and managerial implications. From a policy point of 
view, it has been argued that the lack of number portability was the main source of 
switching costs in the industry and that a policy intervention in this direction would 
have  been  beneficial  for  consumers.  However,  empirical  evidence  shows  that  the 
introduction of number portability has not eliminated switching costs. The fact that a 
significant  part  of  consumers  do  care  about  local  network  effects  reflects  this 
evidence  and  suggests  that,  in  presence  of  consumers  heterogeneity  and  local 
network effects, firms have the opportunity to soften competition. Also we provide 
evidence  on  the  existence  of  two  types  of  consumers:  conscious  consumers,  i.e. 
intensive  users  who  carefully  select  their  operator  and  try  to  minimize  their 
expenditures,  and  unconscious  consumers,  who  are  less  careful  in  selecting  their   21 
operators and pay an extra cost for it. From a firm’s perspective, termination-based 
price  discrimination  can  be  seen  as  strategy  to  attract  conscious  consumers  and 
exploit unconscious consumers.    22 
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TABLE I – IMPORTANCE OF FACTORS FOR ADOPTION  
(1 “NOT IMPORTANT”, 5 “VERY IMPORTANT) 
NETWORK 
COVERAGE 
%  CUM.  FAMILY WITH 
THE SAME 
OPERATOR 
%  CUM. 
1  10.83  10.83  1  22.29  22.29 
2  5.10  15.92  2  7.64  29.94 
3  12.10  28.03  3  21.66  51.59 
4  41.40  69.43  4  28.66  80.25 
5  30.57  100.00  5  19.75  100.00 
SPECIAL 
OFFER 
%  CUM.  PARTNER WITH 
THE SAME 
OPERATOR 
%  CUM. 
1  8.28  8.28  1  30.00  30.00 
2  5.10  13.38  2  3.75  33.75 
3  13.38  26.75  3  17.50  51.25 
4  30.57  57.32  4  26.25  77.50 
5  42.68  100.00  5  22.50  100.00 
BUNDLING  %  CUM.  AVAILABLE 
SERVICES 
%  CUM. 
1  52.23  52.23  1  37.58  37.58 
2  5.10  57.32  2  11.46  49.04 
3  15.29  72.61  3  27.39  76.43 
4  16.56  89.17  4  13.38  89.81 
5  10.83  100.00  5  10.19  100.00 
TARIFFS  %  CUM.  POST-SALE 
CUSTOMER 
SERVICES 
%  CUM. 
1  12.10  12.10  1  15.92  15.92 
2  6.37  18.47  2  11.46  27.39 
3  12.74  31.21  3  28.03  55.41 
4  47.77  78.98  4  36.31  91.72 





%  CUM. 
1  17.83  17.83 
2  5.73  23.57 
3  14.65  38.22 
4  36.94  75.16 
5  24.84  100.00 
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TABLE II – DETERMINANTS OF ADOPTION 
  TARIFF-QUALITY  NETWORK EFFECTS  BUNDLING 
Network quality  0,764  0,028  -0,034 
Special offers  0,724  0,160  -0,175 
Tariffs  0,670  0,087  0,048 
Post-sales services  0,640  0,153  0,193 
Range of services  0,515  0,023  0,505 
Family with the same operator  0,037  0,902  0,124 
Friends with the same operator  0,238  0,868  -0,033 
Bundling with handset  -0,095  0,069  0,899 
       
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  




TABLE III – PATTERNS OF ADOPTION 












         
Tariff-quality  -0,3076  -2,2821  0,5444  0,1859 
Network effects  0,8113  -1,1369  -0,9435  0,3810 





TABLE IV – CONTRACTS WITH NETWORK EFFECTS 
 
FIRM  TIME PERIOD 






TIM  1  82  11  3 
VODAFONE  2  3  10  5 
WIND    8  1  8 






   26 
TABLE V – DIFFERENCES ACROSS CLUSTERS° 
  Cluster 1  Cluster 2  Cluster 3  Cluster 4  Whole sample 
yearpurch*  0,20  0,20  0,27  0,44  0,31 
expendvoice*  2,32  2,10  2,75  1,76  2,24 
intensityvoice*  6,68  4,80  5,75  5,24  5,77 
promotion  0,80  0,60  0,81  0,87  0,82 
tariffplan*  0,80  0,50  0,48  0,56  0,60 
twosim*  0,50  0,40  0,58  0,31  0,45 
changeop*  0,39  0,50  0,27  0,15  0,27 
services*  0,11  0,60  0,29  0,47  0,32 
expendsms*  1,64  1,30  1,71  1,49  1,59 
autofin  1,45  1,40  1,35  1,24  1,34 
intensitysms  7,16  5,60  6,77  6,89  6,85 
TIM*  0,27  0,40  0,13  0,16  0,20 
VODAFONE*  0,64  0,20  0,75  0,69  0,66 
WIND  0,09  0,10  0,10  0,04  0,08 
HG*  0,00  0,30  0,04  0,09  0,06 
* Statistically significant at 99%. °Mean value for each cluster 
 